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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1692 
_____________ 
 
JOSEPH CURRY, 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRIANNE YACHERA, Individually as Trooper  
for the Pennsylvania State Police a/k/a Brianne Glad;  
RICHARD MCCLURE, Individually and in His Official  
Capacity as Detective for the Exeter Township Police 
Department; EXETER TOWNSHIP, d/b/a Exeter Township 
Police Department; KERRIE FICHTER, Individually and in 
Her Official Capacity as Asset Protection for Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. a/k/a Walmart; WALMART STORES INC, AKA 
WalMart; JOHN DOES 1-10; WALMART STORES EAST 
LP, AKA WalMart 
 
Appeal from the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania 
(No. 5-14-cv-05253) 
District Judge: Hon. Lawrence Stengel 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 10, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, and GREENBERG, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 1, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Joseph Curry appeals the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  Although we will affirm the District 
Court’s order with a modification, we do so with some 
reluctance.  As we will discuss, the circumstances of this case 
appear to exemplify what can be described as a flaw in our 
system of justice — in particular, the inequity bail can create 
in criminal proceedings. 
 
I. 
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In the fall of 2012, Curry read a newspaper article that 
stated there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest, related 
to a theft at a Wal-Mart store in Lower Macungie Township, 
Pennsylvania.  Appendix (“App.”) 29.1  Wal-Mart security 
employee Kerrie Fitcher identified Curry.  App. 30.  Curry 
insists that he had never been in that Wal-Mart store.  App. 
30.  Curry called the Wal-Mart store and spoke to a security 
employee, John Doe,2 who refused to review the store 
surveillance video.  App. 30.  Curry then called the 
Pennsylvania State Police and spoke to Trooper Brianne 
Yachera.  App. 30.  Yachera informed Curry that he was 
going to jail and that the courts would “figure it out.”  App. 
30.   
 
 On October 29, 2012, Curry was arrested and charged 
with (1) theft by deception and (2) conspiracy.  App. 30.  
Unable to afford bail, Curry was jailed.  On November 14, 
2012, while Curry was still in jail, he was charged with “theft 
by deception – false imprisonment” by Exeter Township 
Police Detective Richard McClure.  App. 30.  This charge 
was separate and apparently unrelated to the charges brought 
by Yachera.  Two months later, McClure met Curry in prison, 
admitted Curry was innocent of the November 14 charges, 
apologized, and said he would do whatever he could to help.  
App. 31.  In or about February 2013, McClure’s charges 
against Curry were dropped, but he remained in jail on the 
charges brought by Yachera.  App. 31.  Curry was told he 
would need to wait until September 2013 for the case to 
proceed.  App. 31.  During his imprisonment, Curry missed 
the birth of his child and lost his job.  App. 31.  Curry feared 
losing his home and motor vehicle.  App. 31.  He decided to 
plead nolo contendere to the remaining charges, theft by 
deception and conspiracy.  App. 31.  Following his plea, he 
was released and returned home.  App. 31. 
 
                                              
1 The following facts come from Curry’s First Amended 
Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of this 
appeal.   
 
2 Even though Curry pursues an action against “John Does 1-
10,” only a single John Doe appears in the “Operative Facts” 
section of his complaint.  App 29-30. 
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 On September 12, 2014, Curry filed a lawsuit asserting 
claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false 
imprisonment and seeking damages against Trooper Yachera, 
Detective McClure, Exeter Township, Kerrie Fitcher, John 
Does, and Wal-Mart.3  The claims were made pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and state law.  The defendants moved pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims and the District Court 
granted the motion.  App. 1-14. 
 
 The District Court determined that the constitutional 
claims against Yachera, Wal-Mart, John Does, and Fitcher 
must be dismissed because they were barred by Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).  Next, the District 
Court held that the constitutional claims against McClure 
failed to state a cause of action primarily because McClure 
never “seized” Curry.  After dismissing the federal claims, the 
District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the remaining state law claims.  Curry timely appealed.     
 
II. 
 
 The broader context of this matter is disturbing, as it 
shines a light on what has become a threat to equal justice 
under the law.  That is, the problem of individuals posing 
little flight or public safety risk, who are detained in jail 
because they cannot afford the bail set for criminal charges 
that are often minor in nature.  One recent report concluded 
that “[m]oney, or the lack thereof, is now the most important 
factor in determining whether someone is held in jail pretrial” 
and that “the majority of defendants cannot raise the money 
quickly or, in some cases, at all.”4  By way of example, in 
New York City in 2013, fifty-four percent of those jailed until 
their cases were resolved “remained in jail because they could 
                                              
3 As the District Court noted, Curry named both “Walmart 
Stores, a.k.a. WalMart” and “WalMart Stores East, L.P. a.k.a. 
WalMart.” App. 3.  We will collectively refer to these entities 
as “Wal-Mart.” 
4 RAM SUBRAMANIAN, ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 
INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR:  THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN 
AMERICA, 32 (Feb. 2015). 
5 
 
not afford bail of $2,500 or less.”5  It seems anomalous that in 
our system of justice, the access to wealth is what often 
determines whether a defendant is freed or must stay in jail.  
Further, those unable to pay who remain in jail may not have 
the “luxury” of awaiting a trial on the merits of their charges; 
they are often forced to accept a plea deal to leave the jail 
environment and be freed.6   
 Consider plaintiff-appellant Joseph Curry’s alleged 
circumstances.  The underlying Criminal Complaint charges 
that Curry collected items worth a total of $130.27 at a Wal-
Mart and used a receipt found in the parking lot to return the 
items for cash.7  The maximum sentence he faced for each of 
                                              
5 Id. (citing NEW YORK CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, NEW 
YORK CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY ANNUAL REPORT 30 
(2013)).  
6 In the popular media, there has been much recent attention 
to the plight of poor defendants who are imprisoned because 
they cannot pay their bail, despite posing little flight or public 
safety risk.  See, e.g., Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. Times 
Magazine, Aug. 13, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-
trap.html; Shaila Dewan, When Bail Is Out of Defendant’s 
Reach, Other Costs Mount, N.Y. Times, June 10, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/us/when-bail-is-out-of-
defendants-reach-other-costs-mount.html; Sadhbh Walshe, 
America’s Bail System:  One Law for the Rich, Another for 
the Poor, The Guardian, Feb. 14, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com 
/commentisfree/2013/feb/14/america-bail-system-law-rich-
poor; ALYSIA SANTO, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, WHEN 
FREEDOM ISN’T FREE, Feb. 23, 2015, 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/23/buying-time; 
Robert Lewis, No Bail Money Keeps Poor People Behind 
Bars, WNYC News, Sept. 19, 2013, 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/bail-keeps-poor-people-behind-
bars/.  
 
7 Curry was charged with theft by deception, pursuant to 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3922(a)(1), a misdemeanor of the second 
degree.  He was also charged with criminal conspiracy to 
promote the theft by deception with a co-conspirator, 
pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 903(a)(1), also a 
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the two misdemeanor charges against him was two years.  His 
bail was set at $20,000.8   
 
 Unable to post his bail, Curry was sent to jail and 
waited there for months for his case to proceed.  While 
imprisoned, he missed the birth of his only child, lost his job, 
and feared losing his home and vehicle.  Ultimately, he pled 
nolo contendere in order to return home.  Curry has 
maintained his innocence throughout the criminal 
proceedings and the present matter.  Nevertheless, as part of 
his nolo contendere plea, Curry must pay restitution of 
$130.27 to Wal-Mart and the costs of prosecution.  He was 
sentenced to probation for two years.  Moreover, as discussed 
in Subsection IV(A) below, Curry’s nolo contendere plea 
operates as a procedural bar requiring dismissal of his 
malicious prosecution claim against all defendants except 
McClure.  Thus, Curry’s inability to post bail deprived him 
not only of his freedom, but also of his ability to seek redress 
for the potentially unconstitutional prosecution that landed 
him in jail in the first place. 
 
 Regrettably, our system of justice is not perfect and 
Curry’s case appears to expose an unsettling imperfection.  
On this appeal, we can only consider whether Curry’s section 
1983 claim was properly dismissed by the District Court.  We 
do not criticize Pennsylvania authorities — particularly on the 
limited record before us.  Further, while we highlight a 
problem in our system of justice, we cannot offer a complete 
solution — though we are aware of bail reform efforts under 
                                                                                                     
misdemeanor of the second degree.  The theft was a 
misdemeanor of the second degree because the amount 
involved was $50 or more but less than $200.  18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3903(a)-(c).  The sentence for misdemeanors of the 
second degree cannot be more than two years.  18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 1104(2).   
 
8 This Court requested records from the Court of Common 
Pleas of Lehigh County.  But those records did not include 
any transcript or specific materials from the bail hearing.  As 
a result of this lack of information, we will not question why 
bail was set at $20,000. 
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way.9  We hope those efforts will ensure equal justice under 
the law, regardless of an individual’s ability to pay. 
 
III. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a District Court’s decision to 
grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  Fleisher v. Standard 
Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  We accept all 
factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Id. 
 
IV. 
 
A. 
  Turning to the merits, we consider first whether the 
District Court erred in dismissing Curry’s section 1983 
malicious prosecution claim10 against Yachera, and by 
extension, Wal-Mart, John Does, and Fitcher.  We hold that 
the court did not err. 
 
                                              
9 See Jessica Masulli Reyes, Will Delaware End Cash Bail?, 
The News Journal, Nov. 8, 2015; Tricia L. Nadolny, With 
City’s Jails Jammed, Kenney is Latest to Mull Bail Reform, 
Phila. Inquirer, July 15, 2015, http://articles.philly.com/2015-
07-15/news/64454460_1_prison-population-bail-reform-
overcrowded-prisons; Robert Lewis and Cindy Rodriguez, 
New Bail Alternative Means Freedom for Thousands, WNYC 
News, July 8, 2015, http://www.wnyc.org/story/no-more-bail-
non-violent-offenders/?utm_...people-behind-bars/; Brent 
Johnson, State Supreme Court Chief Touts N.J.’s 
“Significant” Bail Reform, N.J. Advance Media, May 15, 
2015, 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/05/nj_supreme_co
urt_chief_justice.html. 
10 Curry does not separately challenge the District Court’s 
dismissal of his false imprisonment and false arrest claims or 
his state law claims against the defendants.  Therefore, we 
will only focus on his malicious prosecution claims brought 
under section 1983. 
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 In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court determined 
that an action seeking damages for an unconstitutional 
malicious prosecution, conviction, or imprisonment under 
section 1983 is not cognizable if “a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of [a] 
conviction or sentence.”  512 U.S. at 487.  The Court’s 
opinion in Heck was animated by “concerns for finality and 
consistency,” id. at 485, as well as “the hoary principle that 
civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging 
the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 
1983 damages actions,” id. at 486.  Accordingly, under what 
we have termed Heck’s “favorable termination rule,” 
Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cty., 804 F.3d 338, 344-45 (3d Cir. 
2015), a section 1983 action for damages must be dismissed 
unless there was no conviction or sentence or “the plaintiff 
can demonstrate that [a] conviction or sentence has already 
been invalidated,” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.11  If an action will 
not demonstrate the invalidity of the criminal judgment, it 
should proceed.  Id.12   
 
                                              
11 Curry appears to argue that because he was not in custody 
at the time of this action, his section 1983 claim should be 
allowed to proceed.  This appeal appears to be the first time 
Curry has raised this argument.  This argument is therefore 
forfeited.  Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court 
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.”).  
Even if we were to consider this argument, we have 
previously rejected it.  See Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 
173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
12 There is no legal basis for Curry’s argument that Heck 
cannot be raised at the motion to dismiss stage.  Indeed, in 
Heck itself the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of a dismissal at the 
motion to dismiss stage.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 
355, 359 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 512 U.S. 477, 114 (1994).   
Similarly, we have affirmed a dismissal at the motion to 
dismiss stage under Heck before.  See, e.g., Williams, 453 
F.3d at 177.   
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Curry entered a nolo contendere plea for the charges 
brought by Yachera, and under Pennsylvania law, that plea 
must be treated the same as a conviction under Heck.  See 
United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“[A] nolo plea is indisputably tantamount to a conviction . . . 
.”).  Even though Pennsylvania law does not treat a nolo 
contendere as an admission of guilt, it is “equivalent to a plea 
of guilty” and the defendant “consents to being punished as if 
he were guilty.”  Id. at 568 (citing Commonwealth v. Gunter, 
771 A.2d 767, 773 (Pa. 2001) (quotation marks omitted)).  A 
nolo contendere plea “‘cannot be used against the defendant 
as an admission in any civil suit for the same act,’” but the 
judgment of conviction still follows from it, just like a plea of 
guilty.  Id. (quoting Eisenberg v. Commonwealth, 516 A.2d 
333, 335 (Pa. 1986)).  We have noted that even where the 
prosecution moves to dismiss criminal charges, there is no 
favorable termination if the dismissal was the result of a 
compromise, because this would not indicate “that the 
accused is actually innocent of the crimes charged.”  Hilfirty 
v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 1996); see generally 
Havens v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 776, 784 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(“[T]he Heck doctrine derives from the existence of a valid 
conviction, not the mechanism by which the conviction was 
obtained (such as admissions by the defendant), so it is 
irrelevant that Havens entered an Alford plea [maintaining his 
innocence].”); Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 
2006) (“[W]e hold that a conviction based on an Alford plea 
can be used to impose Heck’s favorable termination rule.”).  
For purposes of Heck, Curry was convicted of the charges 
brought by Yachera.   
 
The constitutional claims against Yachera, and by 
extension Wal-Mart, John Does, and Fitcher, are precluded by 
Heck because their success would imply that his conviction 
was invalid.  See 512 U.S. at 486-87.  Curry does not allege 
that his conviction was invalidated to satisfy the favorable 
termination rule.  As a result, we hold that the District Court 
properly dismissed Curry’s constitutional claim of malicious 
prosecution against Yachera, and by extension, Wal-Mart, 
John Does, and Fitcher. 
 
B. 
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We will correct one error by the District Court that the 
parties did not raise or address.  The District Court dismissed 
Curry’s malicious prosecution claims against Yachera, Wal-
Mart, John Does, and Fitcher with prejudice because Curry 
could not prove a favorable termination of the criminal 
proceedings against him.  In such circumstances, the statute 
of limitations begins to accrue when the termination of 
criminal proceedings becomes favorable; that is, when “the 
conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or 
impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.”  Heck, 
512 U.S. at 489.  Dismissal of these claims with prejudice, 
therefore, was in error.  See Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48, 
52 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Disposition of the case on Heck grounds . 
. . warrants only dismissal without prejudice.”); White v. 
Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1997); Fottler v. United 
States, 73 F.3d 1064, 1065 (10th Cir. 1996) (“When a § 1983 
claim is dismissed under Heck, the dismissal should be 
without prejudice.”); Perez v. Sifel, 57 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 
1995) (“[B]ecause appellant could renew these claims [barred 
by Heck] if he ever succeeds in overturning his conviction, 
dismissal without prejudice is appropriate.”); Trimble v. City 
of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995); Schafer v. 
Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Although we affirm 
the district court’s order, we modify the order of dismissal to 
be without prejudice so that Schafer can refile his complaint 
should he succeed in challenging the legality of his continued 
confinement through appropriate state or federal remedies.”).      
Accordingly, we will modify the order of dismissal 
regarding Curry’s malicious prosecution claims against 
Yachera, Wal-Mart, John Does, and Fitcher to reflect that 
these claims are dismissed without prejudice.       
 
V. 
 
 We next consider whether the District Court erred in 
dismissing Curry’s malicious prosecution claim against 
McClure.  McClure’s charges related to involvement in a 
larger theft ring, while Yachera’s charges appear to relate to 
the specific theft at the Wal-Mart.  App. 30-31.  Heck does 
not apply to the claims against McClure because the nolo 
contendere plea only related to Yachera’s charges, not 
McClure’s.  
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To prove a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution 
claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant initiated a 
criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his 
favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without 
probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a 
purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the 
plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the 
concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”  
Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007).13  The 
District Court dismissed the malicious prosecution claim 
against McClure because Curry could not meet the fifth 
element.  We agree with that ruling. 
 
Curry was already incarcerated on Yachera’s charges 
when McClure brought his charges against Curry.14  When 
McClure’s charges were dropped, Curry was still in jail.  As a 
result, McClure never deprived Curry of his liberty “as a 
consequence of” the charges McClure brought against Curry.  
Curry’s liberty had already been deprived.  See United States 
v. Johnson, 703 F.3d 464, 470 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Johnson is 
already incarcerated.  His liberty is already deprived . . . . No 
new deprivation of liberty can be visited upon him . . . .” 
(citation omitted)); Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 222 
(3d Cir. 1998) (“[A] plaintiff asserting a malicious 
prosecution claim must show some deprivation of liberty 
consistent with the concept of seizure.” (quotation marks 
omitted)); Gravely v. Madden, 142 F.3d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 
1998) (“The Fourth Amendment is not triggered anew [when 
a person] has already been ‘seized’ . . . .”); United States v. 
Sutton, 607 F.2d 220, 222 (8th Cir. 1979) (“[A]ppellant was 
                                              
13 The deprivation of liberty element of a malicious 
prosecution claim is required when raising a claim under the 
Fourth Amendment, as appears to be the case with Curry’s 
complaint.  Johnson, 477 F.3d at 82 n.8; App. 33.   
 
14 Curry argues that the District Court went beyond the 
allegations of the complaint when it found that McClure did 
not seize Curry because he was already incarcerated.  But the 
complaint clearly indicates that Curry was already 
incarcerated when McClure charged him.  App. 30.  This 
argument, therefore, is meritless.  
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already confined; he had been legally deprived of his liberty 
and was in the custody of the State of Missouri.  Therefore, 
no interruption of his ‘liberty’ occurred.”); Turner v. Schultz, 
130 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1225 (D. Colo. 2001) (noting the lack 
of any support for the proposition “that an already lawfully 
incarcerated prisoner is seized for Fourth Amendment 
purposes when he is charged with an additional crime.”).15 
 
McClure simply never deprived Curry of his liberty as 
a consequence of his (McClure’s) charges.  Therefore, the 
District Court properly dismissed the Fourth Amendment 
malicious prosecution claim against McClure.   
 
VI. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order of dismissal in all respects except that we will 
modify the order regarding Curry’s malicious prosecution 
claims against Yachera, Wal-Mart, John Does, and Fitcher to 
reflect that these claims are dismissed without prejudice. 
 
                                              
15 Our holding does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff can 
never suffer a “deprivation of liberty consistent with the 
concept of a seizure” when already incarcerated.  See 
Johnson, 477 F.3d at 82.  Curry has not alleged any facts that 
he was seized by McClure.  We leave open the possibility that 
a set of facts could exist where an already imprisoned 
plaintiff can demonstrate a seizure sufficient for a malicious 
prosecution claim.  See Gallo, 161 F.3d at 222 (holding that a 
plaintiff was seized for purposes of a Fourth Amendment 
malicious prosecution claim because he had to post a $10,000 
bond, attend all court hearings, was required to contact 
Pretrial Services on a weekly basis, and was prohibited from 
travelling outside the states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania). 
